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I.

INTRODUCTION

The telephone rings and you answer it. The voice on the
other end greets you and makes you feel like a long-lost friend.
Momentarily caught off guard, you try to identify the voice, and
while you are distracted, the voice makes the pitch. You have
been invited to an event to help a worthy cause. Before you can
respond, the voice suggests that you might consider donating
your tickets, if you cannot attend, so that a disabled child or
some other disadvantaged individual can enjoy the evening's
entertainment.
It is not until much later, if at all, that you discover that
the voice did not belong to the altruistic, volunteer-supporter of
the cause, as you had assumed. Instead, the voice was that of a
paid employee of a for-profit company, independent of and
retained by the nonprofit organization solely to raise money.
The use of paid fundraisers is not intrinsically wrong or
illegal. Many contributors, however, feel that they have been
somehow duped when they later discover that a substantial portion of their contribution was absorbed as fundraising costs and
thus was not available for the charity to use in providing the
direct services of the cause.' Whether contributors are partially
motivated to give by guilt, as in the phone call described above,
or by a "get-rich-quick" sweepstakes scheme, they are nonethe* B.A. 1977, Washington State University; J.D. candidate 1994, University of
Puget Sound School of Law. While serving as Deputy Secretary of State (1985-91), the
Author helped draft and carry out amendments to Washington's Charitable
Solicitations Act, which attempted to respond to the Riley trilogy of cases discussed in
this Comment.
1. See Stephen H. Block, Note, The Post-Riley Era: An Analysis of First
Amendment Protectionof CharitableFundraising,10 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 101,
102 (1991) (citing John Doble, Public Opinion About Charitable Solicitation and the
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less unquestionably motivated also by the solicitor's representation that the contribution will help the cause.
Whatever the motivation, this fundraising pitch, and
others like it, are repeated and consummated frequently
enough to maintain an entire industry of telemarketing and
direct mail fundraisers. These fundraisers assert that their
efforts support their clientele of nonprofit charitable organizations. The degree to which the charities are actually supported
is questionable. Without question, however, fundraising
schemes conducted by phone, door-to-door, and through the
mail have raised the ire of enough citizens to make charitable
solicitations the object of the perennial plea: there ought to be a
law!
Several states have responded to those pleas with a variety
of statutes concerning charitable solicitations. 2 Most of those
statutes, however, display schizophrenic tendencies. Apparently, legislators realize that efforts to control charitable solicitations necessarily implicate First Amendment protections.
Rather than confront this issue directly, the drafters appear to
have attempted to characterize their regulations as something
other than what they are. The result has been a decade during
which the Supreme Court, in a line of cases known as the Riley
trilogy,3 consistently struck down those regulatory schemes as
violating charities' free speech rights. 4 One surveyor of the carnage concluded that a "by-product of this First Amendment protection is the near inability of states to regulate fundraising
effectively."5
There is an alternative explanation for the Supreme
Court's harsh treatment of state fundraising regulation.
Because most charitable solicitation statutes are actually only
thinly veiled attempts to regulate how charities' funds are used,

2. See generally BRUCE R. HOPIaNs, THE LAW OF FUNDRAISING (1991) (summarizing
state laws on charitable solicitations).
3. The three cases comprising the Riley trilogy are Riley v. National Fed'n of the
Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988); Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947
(1984); Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
4. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. First Amendment prohibitions are extended to states through the 14th
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 2; see Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160
(1939) (incorporating 1st Amendment into state law); see, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 749 n.1 (1976).
5. Block, supra note 1, at 102.
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not how the funds are solicited, 6 the statutes invite constitutional challenge as intrinsically overbroad. These statutes
affect the speech of the vast majority of honest charities in an
attempt to control the improper use of donated dollars by a few
bad apples. 7 In each of the three primary charitable solicitation cases in the last decade," efforts to control fraud through
prohibitory and prophylactic methods have been held to be not
tailored narrowly enough to survive heightened First Amendment scrutiny. 9
Regulators should embrace a different approach to regulating charitable solicitation. Controls need not be broad or prohibitory. Rather, controls need only be true to the avowed
purposes of existing legislation. For example, current Washington State law purports to target "deceptive and dishonest practices in the conduct of soliciting funds for or in the name of
charity."' 0 A constitutionally defensible approach would be to
adopt legislation or ordinances that faithfully and honestly
focus on identifying and penalizing such fundraising practices.
This Comment argues that, in the wake of the Supreme
Court's decision in Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 1
state and local regulations are more likely to pass federal constitutional muster if they regulate obnoxious fundraising practices defined with sufficient precision. The Riley trilogy and the
continued existence of charitable solicitation scams have shown
that attempting to prevent the "improper use of contributions
intended for charitable purposes" 12 by regulating how much
charities pay for fundraising services has been not only unconstitutional but also ineffective.
6. Is it fair to accuse states of being as misleading as some of the dishonest

fundraisers they try to regulate? At least the State of Washington was honest enough to
identify as one of its purposes the prevention of "improper use of contributions" when
the Charitable Solicitations Act was extensively rewritten in 1986. WASH. Rsv. CODE
§ 19.09.010(2) (1992).
7. The Author used a "few bad apples" metaphor when testifying in favor of
amendments to the Charitable Solicitations Act before the Judiciary Committee of the
Washington State House of Representatives. The Honorable Earl Tilley, representing
the center of Washington's apple-growing region, objected to the reference, reminding
the Committee that "in Washington, there is no such thing as a bad apple."
8. See cases cited supra note 3.
9. See, e.g., Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637
(1980).
10. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.09.010(1) (1992).

11, 112 S.Ct. 2701 (1992).
12. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.09.010(1) (1992).
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To reach this conclusion this Comment examines four subjects. Part II is a brief review of the Riley trilogy, with an
emphasis on the commercial speech analysis the Supreme
Court employed. In striking down those state and local efforts
to regulate charitable solicitations, the Court suggested that
speech does not retain "its commercial character when it is
inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected free
speech. " 1 3 Some other authors, fixated by the "inextricably
intertwined" language, believe the Riley trilogy inflicts an inevitably fatal injury on any attempt to regulate charitable solicitations.14 This Part focuses on the word that precedes and limits
the words "inextricably intertwined," emphasizing that speech
loses its commercial character only when it is so intertwined
with the charity's message as to be inextricable.
In Part III, Krishna is analyzed as an example of one situation where part of the solicitation was successfully extricated
and regulated. In Krishna, the Court said that a charity could
be restricted from soliciting contributions for immediate pay15
ment, but could not be restricted from distributing pamphlets.
This decision demonstrates that some speech (in this case, solicitation for immediate payment) does not rise to the level of
with the protected speech of
being inextricably intertwined
6
solicitations.'
charitable
For charitable solicitation to survive First Amendment
scrutiny, it is essential to extricate the offensive kinds of speech
from the otherwise fully protected speech. Under the federal
13. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988).

"But even

assuming, without deciding, that such speech in the abstract is indeed merely
commercial, we do not believe that the speech retains its commercial character when it
is inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected free speech." Id. (emphasis
added).
14. Ellen Harris et al., Fundraisinginto the 1990s: State Regulation of Charitable
Solicitation After Riley, 24 U.S.F. L. REv. 571 (1990). "The Riley Court held that even if
charitable solicitation contains elements of commercial speech, it is inextricably
intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech and, therefore, must be analyzed
using the strict scrutiny test." Id. at 615 (emphasis added). Note the more conclusory

tone of this author's statement when compared to the direct quote from the majority
opinion. Riley, 487 U.S. at 796.
15. Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2709, 2710 (1992).
16. See also Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (discussing the
differences between commercial and pure speech). But see Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc'y v.

City & County of San Francisco, 900 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that broad
regulation of sidewalk sales violated 1st Amendment because merchandise sales were
"intertwined" with organization's purpose). See generally Harry Kalven, Jr., The
Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. Ray. 1, 23-27 (arguing
that all speech contains elements of conduct which may be regulated).
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constitution and Bill of Rights, the extricated speech could command some lesser level of protection and can be subjected to
narrowly drawn regulation.17 But the federal constitution is
not the only source of constitutional law. Washington, like the
other forty-nine states, has its own unique state constitutional
perspective. In Part IV, this Comment examines whether and
to what extent the Washington Constitution provides greater or
different protection to charitable solicitations under the state
constitutional freedom of speech provision."'
Finally, in Part V, the elements of a regulatory scheme that
passes both federal and state constitutional limitations are
discussed.
II.
A.

BECOMING INTERTWINED

It Takes Two To Tango: IntertwiningRequires Two Kinds
of Speech

The First Amendment does not classify speech by categorizing the degree of protection it receives. It simply prohibits
Congress from making any law "abridging the freedom of
speech." 19 However, some scholars distinguish, at the outset,
between "the two ways in which government might abridge
speech."2 ° Abridgment can be governmental action either
aimed at noncommunicative impact but nonetheless having an
adverse effect on communicative opportunity, or directly aimed
at communicative impact itself.2 '
One example of the noncommunicative impact of speech is
the playing of loud music in a residential neighborhood in the
middle of the night. Regulations aimed at these impacts are
less strictly reviewed by the Court, as long as they are content
neutral.22 Regulatory action aimed at communicative impact is
17. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. New York Pub. Serv. Comm., 447
U.S. 557 (1980) (describing factors to use to categorize speech as "commercial speech,"
which is subject to a lesser level of 1st Amendment protection).
18. WASH. CoNsT. art. I, § 5.
19. U.S. CONST. amend I.
20. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUT1ONAL LAw § 12-2, at 789 (2d ed.
1988).

21. Id.
22. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); U.S. v. Albertini,
472 U.S. 675, 688-89 (1985); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288, 298 n.8 (1984); see also Carney R. Shegerian, A Sign of the Times: The U.S.
Supreme Court Effectively Abolishes the Narrowly Tailored Requirement for Time, Place
and Manner Restrictions, 25 Loy. LA. L. REv. 453 (1992).
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content specific, and is strictly scrutinized by the
generally
Court. 23
Charitable solicitation regulation is clearly content specific:
its aim is to curtail or compel speech. s4 It clearly is "aimed at
communicative impact," the type of regulation normally subjected to close scrutiny.2 5 Under close scrutiny, the government
must satisfy the heavy burden of showing not only that the regulation is necessary to further a compelling state interest, but
also that it is precisely drawn or narrowly tailored to serve that
26
interest.
Within the realm of content specific regulation of speech,
the Supreme Court has carved out exceptions where the strict
scrutiny test is not applied.2 7 Commercial speech is one such
category, theoretically receiving relatively less First Amendment protection. The Court has struggled to define the philosophical foundations and to identify characteristics of
commercial speech.2 8 The Court, on occasion, has resorted to
defining commercial speech as "speech which does 'no more
than propose a commercial transaction,' "29 and has attempted
and noncommerto explain the distinction between commercial
"3°
sense.
"common
of
cial speech as a matter
Regardless of what factors are used to determine whether
speech is commercial, 3 ' the Court now provides commercial
speech some level of protection. However, the scrutiny that the
Court applies to the regulation of commercial speech is not as
23. See TRIBE, supra note 20, § 12-8, at 832-36.
24. See infra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
25. See TRIBE, supra note 20, § 12-8, at 832-36.
26. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. New York Pub. Serv. Comm., 447 U.S.
557, 564 (1980); see also TRIBE, supra note 20, § 12-8, at 833.
27. See TRIBE, supra note 20, §§ 12-8, 12-18, at 836-37, 931-34. For example, the
1st Amendment does not excuse "falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic,"
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919), using fighting words, Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), or engaging in other types of activities
comprising "no essential part of any exposition of ideas" or that by their "very utterance
inflict injury." Id. at 572.
28. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); Linmark Assocs. v.
Township of Wilingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Valentine v. Crestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942); see also TRIBE, supra note 20, § 12-15, at 890.
29. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762; see also Alan Howard, The
Constitutionality of Deceptive Speech Regulation: Replacing the Commercial Speech
Doctrine with a Tort-BasedRelationalFramework, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1093, 1117
(1991).
30. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978).
31. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 60.
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strict as that applied to fully protected speech. To justify an
abridgment of noncommercial, protected speech, the state must
advance a compelling interest.2 However, the regulation of
commercial speech requires only a substantial interest. 3 In
addition, under the commercial speech doctrine, the regulation
must not be "more extensive than is necessary to serve [the governmental] interest."3 4 Compare this standard to the substantially more severe standard applicable under traditional
protected speech analysis: "Whenever the harm feared could be
suppresaverted by a further exchange of ideas, governmental
" 5
3
unnecessary.
deemed
sion is conclusively
B.

Intertwining That Which the State Tries To Extricate

Those who write charitable solicitation regulations understandably attempt to fashion them to meet the commercial
speech doctrine's demands. If they succeed, the regulation will
be subjected to reduced scrutiny. However, when the Court
examines charitable solicitations regulations, it is often unsympathetic. The Court considers the protected speech aspects of
the communication as dominating the commercial aspects.3 6 As
discussed below, a first reading of the three primary charitable
solicitation cases decided in the last decade can be viewed as
evidence that the Court applied the greater protection of "pure"
speech to the entire solitication, driving into submission any
commercial speech applicability. However, a close reading of
the Riley trilogy reveals that the domination is not as absolute
as some might suggest. Each case in the trilogy is examined in
turn, with this close reading in mind.
32. See TRIBE, supra note 20, § 12-8, at 832-36.
33. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. New York Pub. Serv. Comm., 447 U.S.
557, 564 (1980).
34. Id. at 566.
As a threshold matter, the speech must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading. Turning to the nature of the regulation, the state interest
advanced by the restriction must be "substantial." Next, the regulation must
directly advance that state interest. Finally, the regulation must not be "more
extensive than is required to serve the governmental interest."
TRIBE, supra note 20, § 12-15, at 900.
35. TRIBE, supra note 20, § 12-18, at 833-34.
36. See Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 633
(1980). "[Qur cases long have protected speech even though it is in the form of... a
solicitation to pay or contribute money." Id. (summarizing New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964)). But see Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,
474-75 (1989) ("Including these home economics elements no more converted [a
Tupperware party] into educational speech, than opening sales presentations with a
prayer... would convert them into religious or political speech.").
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Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better
Environment

In 1980, the Supreme Court decided Village of Schaumberg
v. Citizens for a Better Environment,37 the first of the Riley trilogy. At the core of the controversy was a village ordinance
effectively prohibiting door-to-door solicitation by organizations
failing to provide "proof that at least seventy-five percent of the
proceeds of such solicitations will be used directly for the charitable purpose of the organization." 38 The Court refused to characterize charitable solicitations as commercial speech, noting
categorically that "because charitable solicitation does more
than inform private economic decisions and is not primarily
concerned with providing information about the characteristics
and cost of goods and services, it has not been dealt with in our
cases as a variety of purely commercial speech." 39 The Court
felt that whatever commercial speech was conducted by the canvassers was subsumed by a "variety of speech interests.., that
are within the protection of the First Amendment."4"
Although the Court did not apply the less strict commercial
speech test in this case, it did not adopt the notion that charitable solicitation is immune from regulation. 41 Any regulation of
charitable solicitation, however, would need to be "reasonable"
and "undertaken with due regard for the reality that solicitation is characteristicallyintertwined"with protected speech. 42
In Schaumberg, the Court saw a communication in which
the solicitation fell under the umbrella of protected speech.
Thus the strict scrutiny test applied. However, the Court provided for and described a less rigorous test that apparently
37. Schaumberg, 444 U.S. at 620.
38. Id. at 624 (citing SCHAUMBERG, ILL., CODE ch. 22-20(g) (1975)).
39. Id. at 632.
40. Id. (referring to protected speech interests in "communication of information,
the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes").
41. The issue before us, then, is not whether charitable solicitations ... are
within the protections of the First Amendment. It is clear that they are ....
The issue is whether the Village has exercised its power to regulate solicitation
in such a manner as not unduly to intrude upon the rights of free speech.
Id. at 633.
42. Id. at 632 (emphasis added). The Village of Schaumberg's ordinance obviously
failed to give this reality its due; the ordinance was invalidated as facially overbroad.
Id. at 634-35. The regulations were not drawn narrowly enough to serve the Village's
legitimate interest of preventing fraud without interfering with 1st Amendment
freedoms. Id. at 637 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) ("Broad
prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect. Precision of regulation
must be the touchstone. .. "A
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would apply when the commercial speech was not so overwhelmed by pure speech considerations. By using words such
as "reasonable," the Court suggested that given the right facts it
would apply a test resembling that traditionally applied to commercial speech.
2.

Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co.

The extent of the intertwined relationship between commercial and protected speech was expanded four years later
the Court decided Secretary of State v. Jospeh H. Munson
when
Co. 43 In Munson, the Court found unconstitutional a state
statute that prohibited charities from paying fundraisers more
than twenty-five percent of the amount raised in connection
with any fundraising activity.4 4 The action was not brought by
a charitable organization but by the Joseph H. Munson Co., an
Indiana for-profit organization in the business of promoting
fundraising events.4 5
By allowing a for-profit fundraiser to argue on behalf of
Maryland charities, the Court extended the domination of protected speech over commercial speech. After Munson, the existence of a commercial fundraising relationship between speaker
and audience would not be enough to detract the Court from
applying the highest level of protection to the speech. The commercial nature of the relationship of the parties involved is
apparently irrelevant in determining whether speech is, or is
not, governed by the commercial speech doctrine.4 6
As the Court expanded the reach of the commercial speech
doctrine, it also reinforced the presumption that the protected
speech aspects of charitable solicitation dominates its commercial aspects. In examining Munson's First Amendment claim,
the Court restated the basis for the conclusion it reached in
Schaumberg.4 7 According to the Munson Court, the key to the
Schaumberg decision was the reality that solicitations are
43. Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
44. Id. at 970.
45. Id. at 950. The Court granted standing to Munson even though the company
did not claim that the statute infringed upon its own rights. Instead, its argument
rested solely on its ability to assert the 1st Amendment rights of the Maryland charities
it served. Id. at 955 n.6.
46. Id. at 967 n.16 (citing Schaumberg, 444 U.S. at 635-36). But see Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 (1983) (providing that the economic
motivation of the speaker is one consideration in establishing speech as commercial).
47. Munson, 467 U.S. at 959.
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"characteristically intertwined" with protected speech.4 8 However, the Munson Court's restatement was not entirely faithful
to the Schaumberg language. Instead of an admonition to
respect that reality, Munson proclaimed "that charitable solicithey are entitled to
tations are so intertwined with speech that
49
the protections of the First Amendment."
After Schaumberg, the intertwining of protected and commercial speech arguably had to be respected when drafting regulations affecting charitable solicitations. To give this
argument meaning, it must be presumed that the Court
believed it possible that some aspect of charitable solicitation
could fall outside the scope of protected speech. However, the
Munson Court appeared to dismiss that possibility and opted
instead for a presumption that charitable solicitations are, categorically, "so intertwined" that there is no need to examine any
other possibility. 50 As a result, any regulation affecting charitable solicitation would be strictly scrutinized and must advance a
compelling governmental interest and be narrowly drawn to
achieve that goal in the least restrictive manner, a task seemingly impossible to achieve.
3.

Riley v. National Federationof the Blind

In Riley v. National Federationof the Blind,5 1 the final case
of the trilogy, the Court seemingly reaffirmed Munson's categorical presumption that charitable solicitations always fall within
the scope of protected speech. 52 In Riley, the challenged North
Carolina statute required that fundraisers' fees not be "unreasonable."5 3 The reasonableness of fees was defined by a threetiered scheme. At the first tier, fees below a certain percentage
were presumed reasonable. 54 At the second tier, a greater percentage fundraising fee was deemed reasonable if the fundraising activity involved the "dissemination of information,
discussion, or advocacy." 5 At the third tier, a fee above a certain percentage was deemed unreasonable and was prohibited,
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
52. Id. at 796.
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131C-17.2(a) (1986).
54. Id. § 131C-17.2(b).
55. Id. § 131C-17.2(c). In its apparent attempt to favor clearly protected speech
activities, North Carolina logically included such speech within its regulation, thereby
suffering the consequences of full 1st Amendment scrutiny.
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absent a special showing by the fundraiser prior to conducting
the solicitation.5" The statute also required fundraisers to disclose to potential donors the average percentage of gross
receipts actually turned over to charities by the fundraiser during the previous twelve months.5 7
Rather than invoking the commercial speech doctrine,
North Carolina characterized its three-tiered scheme as an economic regulation with only an indirect effect on protected
speech.58 The Court rejected North Carolina's attempt to avoid
the commercial speech/protected speech question. The Court
considered the regulation to burden speech, and acccordingly
"subjected the State's statute to exacting First Amendment
scrutiny."5 9 The Court again asserted that "using percentages
to decide the legality of the fundraiser's fee is not narrowly tailored to the State's interest in preventing fraud."6 °
The Court confronted a new commercial speech argument
when it turned to the provision requiring disclosure at the
"point-of-solicitation." 6 1 The Court recognized that "compelled
speech" is inherently content based because "[m]andating
speech that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily
alters the content of the speech." 62 North Carolina attempted to
avoid strict scrutiny of this provision by arguing that the compelled speech provision "regulates only commercial speech
because it relates only to the professional fundraiser's profit
from the solicited contribution."6 3
Recalling Schaumberg's holding that solicitations cannot be
considered merely a variety of commercial speech," the Court
could have rejected the state's proposition outright. Instead,
the Court considered, arguendo, that the fundraiser's speech
was commercial because it related to the findraiser's motivation for speaking.65 Even assuming that such speech, in the
abstract, is indeed merely commercial, the Court did not believe
"that the speech retains its commercial character when it is
inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. § 131C-17.2(d).
Id. § 131C-16.1.
Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 790 (1988).
Id. at 789, 790.
Id. at 789.
Id. at 795-801.
Id. at 795.
Id.
Id. at 796; see also supra notes 39, 40 and accompanying text.
See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 (1983).
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speech."6 6 Instead, the Court simply found that "the component
parts of a single speech are inextricably intertwined." 7 As a
result, the Court refused to "parcel out the speech, applying one
test to one phrase and another test to another phrase," and
applied the test for fully protected expression. 68 The Court
found the point-of-solicitation compelled speech provision
"unduly burdensome," "not narrowly tailored," and
69
unconstitutional.
Curiously, Riley implies that compelled speech would not
necessarily fail under strict scrutiny. After announcing that its
"lodestars in deciding what level of scrutiny to apply.., must
be the nature of the speech taken as a whole and the effect of
the compelled statement thereon,"7 ° the Court authorized,
albeit in dicta, one instance where the state could compel the
speech of a person making a charitable solicitation. 7 ' Referring
to an unchallenged provision in the state's disclosure law, the
Court pronounced that "nothing in this opinion should be taken
to suggest that the State may not require a fundraiser to disclose unambiguously his or her professional status."7 2
Riley may not have been the final nail in the coffin of state
efforts to regulate charitable solicitations. Instead, Riley
illuminates two approaches that avoid the rule that content
specific speech regulations are subjected to the highest scrutiny. The first approach is to craft regulations narrowly enough
to withstand strict First Amendment scrutiny. The Court's
approval of compelled disclosure of certain unambiguous information establishes the validity of that approach.7 3 The second
approach implied by Riley is the possibility that commercial
speech might not always be inextricably intertwined with protected speech during a charitable solicitation. If such speech
does not retain its commercial character when it is inextricably
intertwined with protected speech, it must be possible that commercial speech is not always so intertwined. The Krishna case,
discussed in the next Part, proves that the possibility exists.
66. Riley, 487 U.S. at 796.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 798.
70. Id. at 796.
71. Id. at 799 n.11. But see id. at 803 (Scalia, J., concurring) (accepting majority's
reasoning except for footnote 11).
72. Id.
73. Id.
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KRISHNA SHOWS THAT SOME SPEECH CAN BE EXTRICATED
FROM CHARITABLE SOLICITATIONS

In the Riley trilogy, the Supreme Court looked with disfavor on charitable solicitation regulations premised on the purported evil of outside commercial interests. Even interjecting a
commercial interest, such as Munson's paid fundraiser or solicitor, did not tarnish the purity of the charity's protected
speech.74 Perhaps the Court discounted the severity of the commercial evil, or perhaps it generally found no distinction
between commercial and protected speech.7" Whatever the reason, the intertwining of commercial and protected speech
appeared as inextricable as ever.
In Krishna, however, the Court separated a charitable
solicitation's commercial and protected speech components.
The Court held constitutional the New York and New Jersey
Port Authority's ban on solicitation within its airport's terminals.7 6 But the prohibition against the distribution of printed
77
materials in the same areas of the airport was struck down.
Although the Court repeated the Riley trilogy's proposition that
solicitation is a form of protected speech, 78 it distinguished
between the "solicitation and receipt of funds" and, the "distribution of flyers... or any other printed or written materials."7 9
The Port Authority in Krishna uniformly prohibited the
solicitation of funds and the distribution of written materials
"within the interior areas or structures at an air terminal."80
The ban applied only in the terminals; soliciting contributions
and distributing materials were permitted on the sidewalks
outside the terminal buildings.8" Although the terminals contained various commercial establishments where funds were
exchanged for goods and services. However, the plaintiff was
prevented from performing sankirtan, the ritual of going into
public places to disseminate religious literature and solicit
funds.8 2
74. Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 958 (1984).
75. But see Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (separating commercial
and pure speech in the context of a Tupperware party at a public institution of higher
education).
76. Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2709 (1992).
77. Id. at 2710.
78. Id. at 2705; see also id. at 2721 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 2704.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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Neither the majority nor the concurring justices used a
commercial speech analysis. In striking down the ban on the
distribution of printed materials, the Court agreed that "the
right to distribute flyers and literature lies at the very heart of
the liberties guaranteed by the... First Amendment. The Port
Authority's rule, which prohibits almost all such activity, is
among the most restrictive possible of those liberties." 3 In justifying the ban on solicitations, however, the Court depended on
doctrines that, like the commercial speech doctrine, afford a
lower level of First Amendment protection.
With respect to the ban on solicitations within the government-owned airport terminals, the majority applied "a 'forumbased' approach for assessing restrictions that the government
seeks to place on the use of its property."8 4 This approach is
applicable when "the government is acting as a proprietor, managing its internal operations, rather than acting as a lawmaker
with the power to regulate or license." 5 In these situations, a
government's "action will not be subjected to the heightened
86
review to which its actions as a lawmaker may be subject."
When speech occurs within government property that is not
considered a traditional public forum, "[t]he challenged regulation need only be reasonable, as long as the regulation is not an
effort to suppress the speaker's activity due to disagreement
with the speaker's view."87
In the majority's view, prohibiting solicitations within air88
port terminals operated by the Port Authority is reasonable.
In upholding the regulation, the Court recognized the considerable difficulty facing the Port Authority in achieving its legitimate interest of assuring that travelers are not interfered with
unduly.89 The Court deemed that in the confines of a busy airport terminal, the disruptive effects and risks of duress
presented by face-to-face solicitations were undue
interferences. 90
83. Id. at 2720 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
84. Id. at 2705 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed'uc. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 800 (1985)).
85. Id. (citing United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990) (plurality
opinion)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2705-06 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 46 (1983)).
88. Id. at 2709.
89. Id. at 2708.
90. Id.
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Justice Kennedy concurred with the Court's holding on the
ban on solicitations. However, he applied an analysis that "differs in substantial respects from that of the Court."9 ' Justice
Kennedy's analysis did not depend on finding that the airport
terminal was a nonpublic forum, deserving special consideration under a forum-based analysis. 2 Instead, Justice Kennedy
argued that the regulation should "be upheld as either a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, or as a regulation
directed at the nonspeech element of expressive conduct."93
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that if the Port Authority
had attempted to prohibit all speech soliciting contributions,
the regulation could not have been considered content neutral. 94 As he characterized the regulation, it does not "prohibit
all speech that solicits funds ... it is directed only at the physi-

cal exchange of money, which is an element of conduct interwoven with otherwise expressive solicitation."" Referring to
many of the same "risks of duress" cited by the majority," Justice Kennedy concluded that
[b]ecause the Port Authority's solicitation ban is directed at
these abusive practices and not at any particular message,
idea, or form of speech, the regulation is a content-neutral
rule serving a significant government interest.... The government cannot, of course, prohibit speech for the sole reason
that it is concerned the speech may be fraudulent. But the
Port Authority's regulation does not do this. It recognizes
that the risk of fraud and duress is intensified by particular
conduct... and it addresses only that conduct. We have recognized that such narrowly drawn regulations are in fact the
proper means for addressing the dangers which can be associated with speech.9 7
According to Justice Kennedy, the regulation succeeds in part
because it burdens only soliciting money for immediate receipt,
which is the evil the regulation seeks to avoid.98
Charitable solicitation regulation would be straightforward
in the future if the Court had adopted Justice Kennedy's rea91. Id. at 2715 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
92. Id.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 2720.
Id. at 2721; see also supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
Krishna, 112 S. Ct. at 2721.
See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
Krishna, 112 S. Ct. at 2722 (citations omitted).
Id.
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soning. States would become virtual laboratories for regulation
in this area, narrowly tailoring restrictions to address only the
time, place, and manner of solicitation and carefully assuring
themselves of justifications "unrelated to the content of the
speech or the identity of the speaker."99 However, the Court
apparently is not ready to open the floodgates of regulatory fervor, which have been restrained by the content specific barrier
for over a decade. The Court's lack of enthusiasm for Justice
Kennedy's concurrence' 0 0 is a clear signal that it is not ready to
embrace the view that regulation of charitable solicitation regulations can be characterized as content neutral. The Court is
unwilling to lower the standard of review to the level of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.
On the other hand, the lesson of Krishna is not limited to
government-operated facilities, such as public airports and miliary bases that have been designated nonpublic fora. Krishna's
value stems from the possibility that the Court may be ready to
recognize some distinction between a solicitation's commercial
and protected speech, whether it occurs in a public or a nonpublic forum. It does not matter whether the decision was based on
Justice Kennedy's content neutral analysis, or on the majority's
forum-based approach. The Court treated similar face-to-face
encounters differently: those involving an immediate financial
exchange were deemed subject to regulation; those involving
only the dissemination of information were not. The element
that distinguishes the two similar encounters is the commercial
transaction. In Krishna, the Court has effectively shown that
the commercial transaction is not inextricably intertwined with
the protected speech of a charitable solicitation.'
If a monetary transaction is severable from the expressive
portion of a charitable solicitation because the transaction
intensifies the risk of fraud or duress, then other similarly severable components of a charitable solicitation can also be regulated as commercial speech. The challenge is to craft a
99. Id.
100. No Justices joined the section of Justice Kennedy's opinion in which he argued
for the content neutral analysis. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter joined only
with reference to sections other than the content neutral analysis.
101. Thus, in these situations, we can ignore the Riley admonition that the Court
"[clannot parcel out the speech, applying one test to one phrase and another test to
another phrase." Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988). The
admonition is applicable only where "[t]he component parts . . . are inextricably
intertwined." Id. (emphasis added). This is not the case here because the component
parts are not inextricably intertwined.
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regulation that directly, and not more extensively than necessary, advances the
government's interest in preventing that
10 2
fraud or duress.
Even if a regulation of speech survives federal constitutional review, it does not necessarily satisfy the potentially
stricter requirements of a state's constitution. As discussed
below, state constitutions also protect individual rights,
independent and distinct from the federal constitution. Thus,
to determine the exact contours of the limits of charitable solicitations regulation, the state constitutional provision protecting
the free speech rights of Washington citizens must also be
examined.
IV.

A.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYsIs

The Need for Independent State ConstitutionalAnalysis

In this Comment I have argued that charitable solicitations
have presumptively and erroneously received the same high
level of protection afforded political expression. I have also
argued that when, as in Krishna,certain, less protected aspects
of the speech can be extricated from the protected speech, less
protected speech can be regulated. These arguments are based
on recognized classifications of expression, such as political
speech and commercial speech. Such is the nature of contemporary jurisprudence under the First Amendment of the federal
constitution.
The federal constitution is only one of fifty-one expressions
of fundamental individual rights enjoyed by citizens of the
United States. Although the federal constitution establishes
minimum levels of individual protections, 10 3 each state also has
a constitution that expresses a unique understanding of the
relationship between the state and the people from which it
draws its sovereign power.
After selected fundamental rights began to be recognized as
incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment and extended
to the states, 0 4 many state courts appeared to apply exclusively
federal analysis to resolve fundamental rights issues even
though parallel or analogous state constitutional provisions
102. See infra Part V.
103. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("The Constitution of the United States is
the supreme law of the land.").
104. See supra note 4.
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Not until the Burger and Rehnquist Courts slowed

and reversed the Warren Court's expansion of individual rights
in the criminal justice arena did state courts actively begin to
reassert, on independent state grounds, additional individual
0 6

rights.1

In deciding cases based on these rights, a state court must
establish clearly that the grounds supporting the decision are
based on state constitutional analysis, independent of federal
rationale. Only if the state court's decision rests on a truly
independent state constitutional analysis will the state court's
decision avoid the Supreme Court's assumption of jurisdiction. 07 States with an actively independent judiciary have
developed mechanisms to articulate clearly not only what
grounds are being employed to establish a new state constitutional jurisprudence, but also that these grounds are intended
to be and actually are independent of federal precedent.'
The Washington State Supreme Court enunciated its version of a mechanism designed to establish clearly such
independent state grounds in State v. Gunwall.' °9 Six nonexclusive, neutral criteria were identified as helpful in establishing a principled state constitutional jurisprudence: (1) textual
language, (2) differences in the texts of the state and federal
constitutions, (3) constitutional history, (4) preexisting state
law, (5) structural differences between the state and federal
and (6) matters of particular state or local
constitutions,
10
concern."
The Gunwall factors are used to determine not only
"whether on a given subject the Washington constitutional provision affords greater protection than the minimum protection
afforded by the federal constitutional analysis,""' but also to
determine what level of greater protection should be
105. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977); see also Robert F. Utter, Freedom and
Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectiveson State Constitutions and the Washington
Declarationof Rights, 7 U. PuGET SoUND L. REv. 491 (1984).
106. Utter, supra note 105, at 493.
107. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983).
108. See Robert F. Utter, The Practice of Principled Decision-Making in State
Constitutionalism: Washington's Experience, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 1153 (1992).
109. 106 Wash. 2d 53, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
110. Id. at 61-62, 720 P.2d at 812-13.
111. Ford Motor Co. v. Barrett, 115 Wash. 2d 556, 568, 800 P.2d 367, 374 (1990).
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afforded. x1 2 With regard to the first determination, the Washington Supreme Court has applied the Gunwall factors to the
freedom of speech provision 1 3 of the Washington Constitution. 114 Because this is the provision that applies to charitable
solicitations, the court has determined tacitly that these factors
demand an independent analysis in these circumstances. The
question remaining is the degree of difference in the protection
afforded.
B.

Gunwall FactorsApplied to the Washington Freedom of
Speech Provision

Since Gunwall was first applied, the six nonexclusive factors have been applied in different ways," l5 so that today it may
be expedient to characterize the analysis as having three essential components: (1) a textual analysis; (2) an immutable structural fact demanding that the state constitution receive
independent interpretation; and (3) an historical analysis to discover the framers' intent, any principled bases for an extension
of greater individual rights, and areas of particular local concern. Each factor will be examined separately.
1. Textual Factors
The First Amendment to the federal constitution states
simply that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-

dom of speech.""16 Washington's declaration of the right to free
speech guarantees that "[e]very person may freely speak, write
and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of
" 117
that right.

The First Amendment and Washington's declaration of free
speech contain obvious textual differences. The First Amendment begins "Congress shall make no law," while the state free
speech provision has no similar phrase suggesting a state action
112. See First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 225, 840 P.2d
174, 186 (1992).
113. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5.
114. See State v. Reece, 110 Wash. 2d 766, 778, 757 P.2d 947, 954 (1988)
(obscenity), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 812 (1989).
115. See, e.g., State v. Earls, 116 Wash. 2d 364, 805 P.2d 211 (1991) (Utter, J.,
dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Utter treated the first two criteria together and
argued that the 5th factor (structure of state constitution) will "always support" an
independent interpretation. Id. at 390, 396, 805 P.2d at 227.
116. U.S. CONST. amend I.

117. WASH CONST. art. I, § 5.
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requirement. 1 8 Because the issue under review in this Comment, the statutory regulation of charitable solicitations, inherently involves state action, this aspect of free speech is not
relevant here.
For purposes of this discussion, the more relevant difference between the state and federal free speech provisions is
that the state right begins expansively but is qualified by the
phrase "being responsible for the abuse of that right." 1 9
Justice Robert Utter, a member of the Gunwall court, provides guidance regarding whether a phrase such as this warrants judicial interpretation:
In determining whether a constitutional provision is plain
and unambiguous, and in interpreting it when it is not, the
words used must be given their common and ordinary meaning. Of course, since the common and ordinary meaning of a
given word may have changed over the last century, the judge
must also inquire about the accepted meaning of the words at
the time the provision was adopted, and this information
must often be sought from extrinsic sources.1 2 0
"Abuse" generally has the same meaning today that it did
at the turn of the century. As used today, the noun sense of
"abuse" typically means a "wrong or improper use; [or] misuse."121 Similarly, the 1856 Webster's dictionary defined abuse
as "[i]ll use; improper treatment or employment; [or] application to a wrong purpose."122
The etymology of "abuse" suggests a possible emphasis that
may have affected the word choice of the framers of the Washington Constitution. Three of the seven roots of "abuse" reflect
an emphasis on the misuse of words: "[t]o misrepresent . . . to
•.. cheat, or deceive.. .[t]o wrong with words [or] speak injuriously of ...[or]; to malign, revile."123 A comparison of current
synonyms carries a similar verbal misuse connotation: "Abuse
118. Robert F. Utter, The Right to Speak, Write, and Publish Freely: State
ConstitutionalProtectionAgainst Private Abridgment, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv.157,
170-71 (1985).
119. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5.
120. Utter, supra note 105, at 509.
121. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIoNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 9 (2d ed. 1987).

122.

WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED AMERICAN DIcTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 7

(George and Charles Merriam eds., 1856).
123. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 59 (2d ed. 1989).
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implies an4 outburst of harsh and scathing words against
" 12
another.
One implication deriving from the choice of the word
"abuse" in this context is that it refers to common law restrictions against defamation, particularly libel. Whether the choice
was intended to imply a limitation on the reach of this restriction is unclear and will be discussed in the context of constitutional history. However, one historic application of the word
immutable nature of the
"abuse" challenges the seemingly
125
structure of state constitutions.
2.

Structural Factors

The structural factor is most typically employed to argue
that a state constitution should be interpreted independently.
Generally speaking, state constitutions immutably differ from
the federal constitution. While the U.S. Constitution is a grant
of enumerated powers, state constitutions serve "only to limit
the sovereign power which inheres directly in the people and
indirectly in their elected representatives. . . . Hence, the
explicit affirmation of fundamental rights in [a state] constitution can be seen as a guarantee of those rights and not as a
restriction upon them." 2 '
Gunwall's structural factor does not necessarily force the
conclusion that the Washington Constitution affords greater
protections than does the federal constitution. It is not inconsistent with the view of a state constitution as essentially a
guarantor of rights to recognize that those rights also may be
restricted by the constitution. Only through the device of a constitution can the sovereign be constrained. The sovereign capable of being so constrained includes not only the government
created by the sovereign people, but also the sovereign people
themselves.
Limiting the liberties of the sovereign people may have
been on the minds of the framers of the Washington Constitution in 1889. The editors of the 1856 Webster's dictionary chose
the following quote attributed to James Madison to portray the
meaning of abuse: "Liberty may be endangered by the abuses of
124.

WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED

DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH

LANGUAGE (Portland House 1989).
125. See supra note 115 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV.B.2.
126. State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 966 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
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liberty, as well as by the abuses of power."1 2 7 Madison recognized that unfettered liberty was as dangerous as absolute
power. The absolute liberty of free speech was considered as
much in need of restriction as were the powers of government.
It is axiomatic that only through the means of a constitutional
provision could the people restrict themselves. Despite the general view that a state constitution is a restriction on government power, it is not inconceivable that a proper constitution
would also restrict some individual liberties. Thus, as the people restrict their right to speak freely, the government receives
the power to sanction abuses of the right. In this way, the
Washington Constitution operates much the same as the federal constitution, enumerating a specific power transferred to
the government to punish abuse of the right to speak freely.
3.

Historical Factors

An historical review of the free speech provision requires
an examination of various restrictions on speech that were recognized when the Washington Constitution was written, and of
the status of charitable solicitations at that time. Unfortunately, we are limited to indirect methods of discovering the
meaning of the state's free speech provision as it relates to charitable solicitations because little direct evidence to that effect
exists: "Washington's enabling act was silent on the subject of
freedom of expression, and none of the members of the Preamble and Declaration of Rights Committee of the Washington
Constitutional Convention appears to have written any articles
relevant to the state free speech provision." 28
What was to become Washington's freedom of expression
provision went through several revisions. The unsuccessful
constitutional convention of 1878 provides a first indication:
Every person may freely speak, write and publish his opinion
on all subjects, being responsiblefor the abuse of that liberty;
127. WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 7

(George and Charles Merriam eds., 1856). The passage comes from Madison's defense
of "a senate appointed not immediately by the people, and for the term of six years."

THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 428 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). In these
words, Madison rejects the criticisms that such a body would "acquire a dangerous
preeminence in the government, and finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy"
overwhelming the more numerous and democratic House of Representatives. Id. A
"well constructed Senate," Madison argued, was needed to safeguard against the
tyranny of the people's own passions and "popular liberty." Id. at 425.
128. Utter, supra note 118, at 158 n.4, (citing Utter, supra note 105, at 510-13).
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and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of
speech or the press. In all prosecutions for libel, the truth
may be given in evidence to the jury, and if it appears that
the matter charged as libelous to be true, and was published
with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party accused
shall be acquitted. 2 9
The Portland Oregonian, on the opening day of the 1889
Olympia convention, provides the next official documentation of
the free speech provision. 130 This version stated that "[n]o law
shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or
restricting the right to speak, write or print freely on any subject whatever, but every person shall be responsible for the
abuse of this right."13 1
Delegate Weir officially submitted the following text to the
convention one week later, on July 11, 1889: "The right of free
speech written, printed or spoken, when not infringing the
remain inviolate, and shall be
rights of others, shall forever
1 32
citizen."
every
to
secured
Two weeks later, on July 25, 1889, the Committee on the
Preamble and Declaration of Rights presented the current
wording: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish on
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right."'3 3
This version was eventually adopted without recorded amendment or comment.
Each of these successive versions contains a similar limitation: that those exercising the right to free speech are responsible for the abuse of the right. Yet, only the 1878 proposal
specifically references libel. Because Washington's constitutional convention delegates drew heavily from Oregon's experience, the debates of the 1857 Oregon Constitutional Convention
may provide some explanation.
The original report of the Oregon committee on the bill of
rights contained a freedom of speech provision and a separate
129. John T. Condon, Documents-Washington's First Constitution, 1878, WASH.
HIST. Q., Jan. 1919, at 62 (emphasis added).

130. See W. Hill, Washington: A Constitution Adapted to the Coming State, THE
[PORTLAND] MORNING OREGONMAN, July 4, 1889, at 9 (typed edition available in the
Washington Room of the Washington State Library, Olympia).
131. Id. This version is identical to OR. CONST. art. I, § 8.
132. THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1889
51 (Beverly Rosenow ed., 1962) (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 154 (emphasis added).
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"truth defense to libel" provision. 134 The freedom of speech provision included a sentiment similar to the eventual Washington
free speech restriction that "every person shall be responsible
for the abuse of this right."13 5 It was adopted without
36
amendment. 1
Oregon's proposed truth defense to libel provision, however,
prompted lengthy debate 13 7 and was eventually defeated, not in
any small measure because of the argument that "the previous
section [making publishers responsible for what was printed]
covered all the ground." 3 '
More than three decades later, the Oregon Supreme Court
clarified the effect of defeating this provision. In Upton v.
Hume,'1 39 decided less than four years after Washington
achieved statehood, the Oregon high court said that
It]he term "freedom of the press," which is guarantied [sic]
under the constitution, has lead [sic] some to suppose that the
proprietors of newspapers have a right to publish with impunity charges for which others would be held responsible. But
this is a mistake. The publisher of a newspaper possesses no
immunity from liability on account140of a libelous publication,
not belonging to any other citizen.
The Washington Supreme Court decided similarly, in separate libel cases involving a matter relating to the character of a
public official 14 1 and "certain actions and conduct of [a private]
individual at the time of the supposed discovery of a crime, from
which damaging inference might be drawn."' 4 2 Relatively early
in statehood the Washington court established that libel was
not the only potential abuse of the right to speak freely that was
beyond constitutional protection and within the police power of
143
the state.
134.

THE OREGON CONSTITUTION AND PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1857 119 (Charles H. Carey ed. 1926).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 309.
137. Id. at 310.

138. Id.
139.
140.
141.
142.

33 P. 810 (Or. 1893).
Id. at 812.
Byrne v. Funk, 38 Wash. 506, 512, 80 P. 772, 773-74 (1905).
Haynes v. Spokane Chronicle Publishing Co., 11 Wash. 503, 503, 39 P. 969,

969 (1895).
143. See State v. Fox, 71 Wash. 185, 186, 127 P. 1111, 1112 (1912), aff'd, 236 U.S.
273 (1915) (holding that fighting words establishing clear and present danger are
unprotected under the 1st Amendment); State v. Gohl, 46 Wash. 408, 410, 90 P. 259,
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The Oregon Supreme Court recently summarized the logical extension of these turn-of-the-century decisions. That court
held that the Oregon freedom of speech provision 144 prohibits
any law relating to free speech that goes beyond providing a
remedy for the abuse of this right. 14 5 The Oregon court said
that
[t]his forecloses the enactment of any law written in terms
directed to the substance of any "opinion" or any "subject" of
communications unless the scope of the restraint is wholly
confined within some historical exception that was well
established when the First American guarantees of freedom
of expression were adopted and that the guarantees then or
[at statehood] demonstrably were not intended to reach.
Examples are perjury, solicitation or verbal assistance in
crime, some forms of1 4theft,
forgery and fraud and their con6
temporary variants.

In addition to a review of the development of freedom of
speech under the state constitution, Gunwall also requires an
historical examination of preexisting state law and other facts
that help demonstrate the sources and nature of the state's
interest in regulating charitable solicitations.
Even before Washington became a state, benevolent and
14 7
charitable societies found their way into the Territorial Code.
These societies typically were fraternal organizations or institutional social or health care branches of religious sects, bearing
little resemblance to today's diverse range of social service
agencies dependent on organized public fundraising campaigns.
However, the precursor to one of today's best-known charitable
fundraising organizations, the United Way, got its start in

260 (1907) (holding that nonlibel defamation is generally within police power under
state constitutions); State v. Tugwell, 19 Wash. 238, 253, 52 P. 1056, 1061 (1898)
(holding that utterances or writings tending to obstruct the administration of justice in
a pending case are not protected by Article I, § 5).
144. OR. CONST. art. I, § 8.
145. State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 576 n.9 (1982).
146. Id. at 576.
147. TERRrrORAL CODE OF WASMINGTON §§ 2450-54 (1881) ("The incorporation of
colleges, seminaries, churches, luceums, libraries and other societies for benevolent,
temperance, charitable and scientific purposes."). These provisions were codified at
statehood by W. Lair Hill in the General Statutes and Codes of the State of Washington
99 1638-42 and are the direct antecedents to the current Nonprofit Corporation Act,
WASH. REv. CODE § 24.03 (1992).
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America two years before Washington's entry into the United

States. 148
Society has long recognized a legitimate governmental
interest in assuring that public charities operate in conformance with the public trust. 1 49 Even while invalidating the regulatory schemes of the 1980s, the Supreme Court recognized that
the government has a significant interest in preventing fraud in
charitable solicitations. 150
Washington's constitutional history demonstrates that the
responsibility for the abuse of the free speech right goes beyond
libel and includes a wide range of damages arising from criminal or misleading communications. With respect to charitable
organizations, the state traditionally and specifically has
extended special status to nonprofit corporations and has continuously embraced them within the same statutory scheme
since before statehood. 15 1 Thus, the state constitution does not
prohibit the regulation of solicitations by charitable organizations. The Washington Constitution appears to approve regulations that are limited to providing relief for damage caused by
the abuse of a charity's freedom of speech. It is from the lesson
of Krishna that we learn how to focus the regulation so that it
accomplishes that goal.
V.

A.

LEARNING THE LESSON OF KRISHNA

Narrowly Crafted, Transaction-SpecificRegulation

One lesson to be learned from Krishna is that although
there may be other ways to curb overzealous charitable fundraising, regulators should focus on those aspects of the solicitation that are transactional, rather than substantive. Both
transactional and substantive aspects of a solicitation clearly
relate to the content of the speech and are normally subjected to
the Court's highest scrutiny. After Krishna, however, transaction-based regulation is more likely to be accepted as falling
within the confines of commercial speech and thus subjected to
a less stringent level of review.
148. See WiLuAM ARAMoNY, THE UNIMTED WAY: THE NExT HUNDRED YEARS 34

(1987).
149. See GARETH JoNEs, HIsToRY OF THE LAw OF CHARY, 1532-1827, 160-68

(1969).
150. See cases cited supra note 3.
151. See supra note 147.
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A second lesson to be gleaned from Krishna has to do with
the severity of the regulation's sanction. Each of the regulations invalidated in the Riley trilogy was essentially a prohibition; the effect of the regulations was to deny speech
absolutely.152 On the other hand, in Krishna, the Port Authority did not absolutely ban the solicitation of contributions; it
merely required that the speech occur in153a location that is not
unduly disruptive to airport operations.
A more constitutionally successful style of regulating charitable solicitation is narrower in its scope and less severe in its
sanction. The approach Krishna suggests is twofold: (1) to
identify the particular obnoxious fundraising practices, such as
the repetitious solicitation for immediate payment; and (2) to
provide a remedy that minimizes or eliminates the obnoxiousness without prohibiting the speech. In the context of
speech regulation, Supreme Court Justice Brandeis stated that
this can be accomplished constitutionally only through "more
speech."' 54
The approach suggested by this reading of Krishna provides a foundation for effective charitable solicitation regulation. Under a Krishna-style commercial speech analysis,
content specific regulation could be applied within the narrow
range of speech affecting the transactional part of the solicitation. With properly drafted regulations, the charitable speech
continues, but when the speech involves certain activities that
intensify the risk of fraud or have been defined as misleading or
suspicious, proper disclosure could be mandated.
Regulations drafted following these guidelines will most
likely be narrowly tailored to prevent fraud, a recognized legitimate state interest. For example, a regulation mandating additional speech appears most constitutionally defensible when the
activity regulated (1) is a discrete, identifiable, verifiable or
purely commercial transaction, such as the exchange of money
152. See Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 784, n.2 (1988);
Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 950 n.2 (1984); Village of
Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 624 (1980).
153. Although Justice Kennedy's reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions
would yield the same result, they would be applicable only in content neutral situations.
154. "[W]henever 'more speech' could eliminate a feared injury, more speech is the
constitutionally-mandated remedy." TRIE, supra note 20, § 12-8, at 834 (referring to
Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927),
overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)); see also Peel v. Attorney
Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 108 (1990) (holding that disclosure of
information is more likely to help decision making than concealment).
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or some other subpart of a financial transaction; and (2) occurs
in situations where the recipient of the solicitation is particularly vulnerable to the risk of fraud or duress (as are harried
travelers rushing to catch a plane).
Washington's Charitable Solicitations Act,' 55 which has
never been challenged, contains several content specific restrictions. 156 For example, solicitors may not misrepresent the tax
deductibility of the donor's contribution, nor misrepresent the
solicitor's employee or volunteer status with the soliciting
entity. 57 Further, if the soliciting organization's name is similar to a unit of government, the solicitor is required to reveal
"whether the charitable organization is or is not part of [that]
unit of government and the true nature of its relationship with
the unit of government."'
Both of these provisions, however,
remain constitutionally suspect under a Krishna commercial
speech analysis. Although the provision regarding disclosure of
tax deductibility arguably deals with a commercial component,
it nonetheless is essentially a prohibition. On the other hand,
the provision requiring an explanation of the relationship with
a governmental entity provides a nonprohibitory, "more speech"
remedy, but falls outside any reasonable category of speech that
1 59
is commercial or transactional in nature.
The prototypical speech that Krishna permits to be regulated deals with the severable financial aspects of the solicitation, and is similar to a deceptive trade practice regulated by
the Federal Trade Commission. 160 For example, the Krishna
commercial speech analysis could be employed to require clear
and conspicuous disclaimers, such as "This is not a bill" or "You
are not obligated to pay this amount," on solicitation material
that is presented in the form of an invoice or billing. It could
also be used to require solicitors to explain clearly, conspicuously, and adequately the various details of a sweepstakes solicitation, including the chances of winning and the true value of
each prize available.
155. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.09 (1992).
156, Id. § 19.09.100(4)-(6).
157. Id. § 19.09.100(4).

158. Id. § 19.09.100(5).
159. Compare Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 799 n.l1 (1988)
with Telco Communications, Inc. v. Carbaugh, 885 F.2d 1225, 1231-32 (4th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 495 U.S. 904 (1990). Both courts held that requiring disclosure of status as
a commercial fundraiser and the availability of financial records was constitutional.
160. The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1988).
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One often-abused fundraising tactic that is particularly
ripe for a Krishna-style regulation is the "why not donate your
scenario sketched at the begintickets to the disadvantaged"
16
ning page of this Comment.
The state has a legitimate interest in preventing the solicitor from not fulfilling the promise, perhaps fraudulently made,
that a disadvantaged individual will be given the opportunity to
enjoy the event. A new law, 1 6 2 administered jointly by the
Washington State Attorney General and Secretary of State, will
help achieve this goal by requiring the solicitor to obtain "written commitments from persons stating that they will accept
donated tickets," presumably (although not required by law) to
pass on to the intended disadvantaged individuals.'6 3 If such
commitments are not obtained, the law prohibits the solicitation.' 6 4 Whether the prohibitory sanction is more extensive
than necessary to advance the interest of preventing fraud
remains the crucial, judicially reviewable question.
The primary difference between this new law and a regulation fashioned from the lessons of Krishna is that the Krishna
regulation would not prohibit the donate-your-ticket scheme.
Rather, a regulation following the Krishna lessons would
require the solicitor to tell the potential donor certain, prescribed information. For example, the solicitor could be
required to disclose the names of the organizations that have
agreed to assist in making sure that each donated ticket is
appropriately assigned, the maximum number of seats to be
reserved for donated use, or how the contributor can verify that
his or her ticket was actually used.
Requiring solicitors to disclose specific material facts relating to the promise is a much more direct regulation of speech
than Washington's new provision, which resembles the essentially prohibitory regulations struck down in the Riley trilogy.
In addition, the Krishna regulation delves no more deeply into
the operations of the charity than is absolutely necessary to provide the public with relevant information upon which to make
an informed choice.
161. A similarly abused fundraising tactic is the practice of soliciting
advertisements for a publication addressing an issue of interest to the charitable
organization (e.g. drug abuse prevention, fire safety) with the commercial component
being a promise to distribute an unstated quantity of publications to the community.
162. Act of July 1, 1993, ch. 471, 1993 WAsH. LAWS 1941.
163. Id. § 9, 1993 Wash. Laws at 1949-52.

164. Id.
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Toward a Donor's Bill of Rights

To make any regulatory system work, two ingredients are
essential. First, the Solicitor must be required to inform the
potential contributor that the regulatory system is in place,
what protections it provides, and how to access it: a "Donor's
Bill of Rights." This disclosure of rights would be in addition to
the particularized disclosures intended to respond to identified
obnoxious practices. The second essential element of an effective regulation of charitable solicitation is an enforcement
mechanism that empowers donors, individually or collectively,
to seek restitution.
Under the regulatory approach envisioned in this Comment, an effective Donor's Bill of Rights incorporates three
affirmative rights:
(1) The right to know who is asking for the donation.
(2) The right to financial information about the solicitor.
(3) The right to a full refund if the donor is deceived.
These are affirmative rights in that they impose a duty on the
soliciting organization to voluntarily provide information. The
solicitor must disclose these rights to the prospective contributor at each solicitation.
Included in the right to know who is asking for the donation
is the right to know whether a solicitor is a separate commercial
enterprise, distinct from the charitable organization. Similarly,
included in the right to financial information is the right to
know that such information exists and how to access it. For
example, solicitors could be required to provide a toll-free
number to call to receive a copy of the solicitor's annual registration. Finally, included in the right to a refund is the right to
know that the donor has this right.
The effective enforcement of these rights is dependent, both
constitutionally and operationally, on the specificity with which
the forbidden practices are defined. The targets for regulation
are those obnoxious tactics that both meet the commercial
speech test and are severable from the expressive or substantive portion of the charitable solicitation. As commercial
speech, the targeted practices are subject to regulation and
become, de facto, the deceptive practices upon which donors
may base claims for restitution.
The donate-your-ticket scheme again serves to illustrate.
Assume a solicitor makes the appeal sketched in the opening of
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this Comment, but fails either to distribute every donated ticket
as promised or to submit to the central registration agency the
required reports evidencing appropriate ticket distribution. In
that case, those donors whose expectations were not satisfied
would need to be notified, at the solicitor's expense, and provided with a range of restitution alternatives: total refund, pro
rata reimbursement for unused tickets, or waiver.
Solicitors need to be encouraged to comply with the requirement to disclose the information comprising the Donor's Bill of
Rights at the point of solicitation. A substantial penalty, perhaps a stated amount such as fifty dollars per contributor, in
addition to full restitution of the amount paid, could be imposed
on solicitors that fail to provide written notice of the Donor's
Bill of Rights.
Previous attempts to regulate charitable solicitations have
involved both prior restraint and prohibitive elements. Rather
than repeat these errors, regulators should move away from
trying to prevent fraud and toward making it easier to punish
perpetrators and to provide restitution for the victim. To
accomplish this, regulators should refocus the attack on abusive
charitable solicitations as a tort, analogous to the communicative crimes considered at statehood to be an abuse of the liberty.
Under this tort approach, the state constitution provides
support for establishing that, at least in the area of charitable
solicitations, the solicitor owes a duty to the prospective donor
not to abuse the right to speak freely on the subject of the charity's activities and fundraising needs. This tort scheme gives
specific definition to the solicitor's duty by describing those
practices that are presumptively deemed misleading.
Careful drafting can avoid language that would run afoul of
both federal and state constitutional provisions barring the prohibition of speech, even offensive speech. For example, instead
of making it a punishable offense to use the name of a governmental agency (such as the city firefighters), a less constitutionally invasive restriction would state the regulation in an "if
clause." The regulation could state that if the solicitor uses the
name of a governmental agency in its solicitation, the solicitor
has a duty to describe in sufficient detail the true nature of the
relationship between the agency and the soliciting organization.
To make this regulatory scheme effective, the duty must be
clearly defined in a statute or administrative regulation, and a
mechanism to enforce the breach of the duty must be assured
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and inexpensive. To accomplish this, the scheme should
authorize actions in small claims court. In addition, once the
dissatisfied donor makes a prima facie showing that a specified
duty not to employ abusive tactics was breached, the burden
should shift to the solicitor to prove that the solicitation was not
objectively misleading. In fairness to solicitors, an action in
damages should provide that a complete and timely refund of
disputed donations is a complete defense. If the solicitor does
not return disputed donations before the donor files an action in
small claims court, a presumptive damage award should be
established that adequately compensates disgruntled donors for
the time, costs, and inconvenience of pursuing the claim. Solicitors that fail to either refund upon demand, or to honor judicially validated claims, should be required to post a surety
bond.
Such provisions would not run afoul of either federal or
state constitutional restrictions and, in addition, would resolve
the current practical difficulties that make it virtually impossi1 65
ble to enforce Washington's Charitable Solicitations Act.
The greatest limitation remains the federal constitutional issue
of extricating and controlling the obnoxious fundraising tactics
from the protected types of speech (advocacy, education,
programmatic description) usually intertwined with an appeal
for financial support. However, by identifying and focusing on
what makes specific tactics and financial schemes misleading,
and empowering individual donors to seek their own retribution, rather than instituting broad prophylactic measures, progress undoubtedly will be made in reducing the abuse of the
public's generosity.
Although the Washington State Attorney General is
empowered to investigate and prosecute violations of the Charitable Solicitations Act, such actions are rare and difficult to
pursue successfully. The entrenched, unscrupulous fundraisers
undoubtedly count on the fact that enforcement comes only
from a single, centralized, and overworked state agency. This
Comment envisions an enforcement mechanism that empowers
each disgruntled donor to pursue an individual claim, or perhaps some way to band together more easily to facilitate class
165. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.09.340 (1992) makes violations of the Charitable
Solicitations Act an unfair practice under WAsH. REV. CODE § 19.86 (1992) (the
Consumer Protection Act); see Hangman Ridge v. Safeco Title, 105 Wash. 2d 778, 780,

719 P.2d 531, 532 (1986) (listing elements required to establish an action under
REV. CODE § 19.86).

WASH.
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action suits. The overwhelming prospect of defending a multitude of such claims may serve notice on these fundraisers that
their practices need to improve, at least temporarily.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Regulation of charitable solicitation has, for too long,
focused on the use of the funds collected rather than the manner in which those funds are collected. The result has been disastrous. Instead of addressing narrow commercial aspects of
solicitations, regulations were drawn inartfully overbroad, violating charitable organizations' free speech. A succession of
Supreme Court decisions striking down these regulations led
some to conclude that meaningful regulation of solicitations is
impossible.
That conclusion is premature, if not completely incorrect.
The hasty conclusion is founded on a misreading of a key phrase
recited in each of the three primary cases on the subject. Those
who say effective regulation of charitable solicitation is dead
misread the Riley trilogy as saying "commercial speech is inextricably intertwined with fully protected speech" and thus commands the Court's highest protection. A more careful reading of
the phrase includes an important qualifier: "when [commercial
speech] is inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech."' 66 Only when speech is so intertwined does it
lose its commercial nature and command higher protection.
Krishna is an example of a charitable solicitation that did
not inextricably intertwine all of its elements with fully protected speech. Combined with the approval of limited compelled speech announced in Riley, Krishna provides an effective
approach to regulating the financial heart of charitable solicitations. By regulating only the transactional elements of solicitations, to the exclusion of substantive issues or expressive
speech, regulators avoid the overbroad scope that contributed to
the fatal injury suffered by the regulations in the Riley trilogy.
And, by establishing sanctions mandating more speech instead
of banning the speech altogether, regulators will more directly
and effectively advance the state's legitimate interest in
preventing fraud.
The Supreme Court has not made it impossible to regulate
charitable solicitations. In Krishna and the Riley trilogy, the
166. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1980) (emphasis
added).
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Court has instead identified a narrow arena where regulators
ought to focus their efforts. Regulators who artfully and carefully apply the concepts found in the commercial speech doctrine will find the arena wide enough to control most offensive
fundraising practices.

